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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Washington legislature waived sovereign immunity of
state and local governmental entities, it provided that those entities shall
be liable for their "tortious conduct to the same extent as if [they] were a
private person or corporation."1 In so doing, the legislature aligned
Washington with a nationwide trend to limit or eliminate the antiquated
notion that the sovereign can do no wrong, instead favoring responsible,
accountable government. 2 This movement was triggered in part by the
passage in 1946 of the Federal Tort Claims Act, which waived the sover-
eign immunity of the United States.3 Overall, the movement reflected the
t Debra L. Stephens and Bryan P. Hametiaux are co-coordinators for the amicus curiae program of
the Washington State Trial Lawyers Association Foundation. Ms. Stephens received her J.D. from
Gonzaga School of Law in 1993. Mr. Hametiaux received his J.D. from Gonzaga School of Law in
1973. Both authors serve as adjunct professors at Gonzaga School of Law, where they co-teach State
Constitutional Law. The views expressed in this article are strictly those of the authors. Special
thanks to the Spokane law firm of Winston & Cashatt for providing clerical assistance in the prepa-
ration of this article.
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (2004) (waiving sovereign immunity of state government);
see also id. § 4.96.010 (waiving sovereign immunity of local governmental entities).
2. See Charles F. Abbott, Jr., Comment, Abolition of Sovereign Immunity in Washington, 36
WASH. L. REV. 312, 314-16 (1961); 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.1 (2d
ed. 1986).
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671-2680 (2000); see also Fowler, supra note 2, § 29.12 (de-
scribing this act as "the most widely important piece of legislation affecting governmental immu-
nity").
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notion that "greater efficiency and justice would be attained by accom-
panying power with responsibility. 4
In a recent article, Washington's Attorney General Rob McKenna
and Senior Assistant Attorney General Michael Tardif argued that Wash-
ington's abolition of sovereign immunity should be re-examined because
it has resulted in unacceptable government tort liability and escalating
litigation costs. 5 That article also criticized court interpretations of gov-
ernment tort liability and the consequences of that liability.6 In response
to a perceived crisis, Tardif and McKenna urged the legislature to replace
the current broad waiver with a scheme that precisely sets forth when the
government is liable in tort.7
This Article takes a contrary view, commending both the legisla-
ture's choice to broadly waive sovereign immunity and judicial decisions
defining the impact of this waiver. In doing so, this Article traces the de-
velopment of government tort liability in Washington both before and
after the state expressly abandoned sovereign immunity in 1961. More-
over, this Article demonstrates that the waiver of immunity did not create
excessive governmental liability. Rather, the waiver has been imple-
mented in a way that not only respects the prerogative of the state and
local entities to govern, but also provides for greater government ac-
countability and individualized justice for Washington citizens.
Part I of this Article traces Washington's history with the common
law doctrine of government immunity from tort liability. It also identifies
other distinct common law immunities protecting executive, legislative,
and judicial functions-immunities that lay dormant during the reign of
sovereign immunity. Part II discusses the legislature's broad waiver of
sovereign immunity in 1961 and the legislature's subsequent reaffirma-
tion of the waiver. It also notes isolated instances in which the legislature
has partially restored immunity or otherwise limited tort liability. Part III
addresses the development of case law interpreting the scope of govern-
ment tort liability in light of the legislative waiver of sovereign immunity
and examines the impact of the remaining related common law immuni-
ties for executive, legislative, and judicial functions. Part III also exam-
ines the role of the "public duty doctrine," which has evolved as a con-
4. Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort [Part II], 34 YALE L.J. 129, 134 (1924);
see also Kilbourn v. City of Seattle, 43 Wash. 2d 373, 375-76, 261 P.2d 407, 408 (1953) (referenc-
ing growing demand for legislation regarding government accountability in tort); Mayle v. Penn.
Dep't of Highways, 388 A.2d 709 (Pa.1978) (discussing history of sovereign immunity and policy
reasons for abrogation of doctrine).
5. See Michael Tardif & Rob McKenna, Washington State's 45-Year Experiment in Govern-
ment Liability, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 50-52 (2005).
6. Id. at 18, 46-47.
7. Id. at 50-52.
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ceptual framework for assessing whether a predicate duty supports gov-
ernment tort liability in any given circumstance. Finally, Part IV exalts
the continuing value of holding government accountable for its tortious
conduct, treating such accountability as a legitimate means to encourage
responsible government and achieve individual justice. Part IV also urges
that any marked retreat from the broad waiver of sovereign immunity is
unnecessary and unjustified, whether viewed from a fiscal or ideological
standpoint.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY IN WASHINGTON
A. Sovereign Immunity
From the formation of the United States, both the federal govern-
ment and the several states adopted the notion of sovereign immunity
that had prevailed in England since ancient times. 8 Historically, sover-
eign immunity was a common law doctrine imposed by the courts as a
matter of policy. 9 This doctrine was well-settled when Washington be-
came a state and so remained well into the twentieth century.'0 The fram-
ers of the Washington constitution implicitly acknowledged default ap-
plication of the doctrine in art. II, § 26: "The legislature shall direct by
law, in what manner, and in what courts, suits may be brought against the
state." Thus, since statehood, it has been understood that the legislature is
constitutionally empowered to alter the common law doctrine of sover-
eign immunity."1
Early in the reign of sovereign immunity, the Washington Supreme
Court required clear evidence that the legislature intended to waive sov-
ereign immunity. For example, on two separate occasions at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, the court held that the legislature's mere
authorization of a right to "begin an action" against the state was not a
sufficient declaration that the state would be responsible for the tortious
acts of its agents and employees. 12 The court required the legislature to
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 45A, introductory cmt. at 393-94; Id. at § 895B
cmt. a (1979).
9. Id. ch 45A, introductory cmt. at 392-93.
10. See Billings v. State, 27 Wash. 288, 291, 67 P. 583, 584 (1902) (recognizing the state as
immune unless liability provided for by statute, as required by WASH. CONST. art. 1I, § 26); Kelso v.
City of Tacoma, 63 Wash. 2d 913, 915, 390 P.2d 2, 4 (1964) (same); see also CODE OF 1881, § I
(common law controls when not inconsistent with statute or constitution); Sayward v. Carlson, I
Wash. 29, 40-41,23 P. 830, 833 (1890).
11. See Billings, 27 Wash. at 290-91, 67 P. at 584 (liability of state determined by statute un-
der WASH. CONST. art. II, § 26); Coulter v. State, 93 Wash. 2d 205, 207, 609 P.2d 261, 262 (1980)
(same).
12. See Billings, 27 Wash. at 292-93, 67 P. at 584-85 (holding state statute, BAL. CODE §
5608, authorizing actions against the state, did not constitute a waiver of immunity); Riddoch v.
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use unmistakable statutory language in order to demonstrate the legisla-
ture's consent to respondeat superior liability. 13
While Washington common law regarding the sovereign immunity
of the state was plain and all-encompassing, the same was not true with
respect to the sovereign immunity of local governmental entities. 14 In
Washington, as elsewhere, entitlement to immunity often turned on the
particular nature of the entity. Geographical subdivisions of the state,
such as counties and school districts, were deemed to partake fully in the
state's immunity. However, municipal corporations, such as cities and
towns, were treated differently because of their independent corporate
status.15 Functions performed by cities and towns were not immune if
those functions were considered "proprietary" in nature.1 6
When local governmental entities were found to be immune from
liability for tortious acts or omissions, they were not deemed immune in
their own right. Instead, their immunity was said to derive from that of
the state.1 7 As a result, cities and towns were imbued with immunity
when they were performing "governmental functions" similar to those
performed by the state, unless that immunity had been waived by statute;
however, if a function was "proprietary" or "corporate" in nature, that
function was subject to tort liability. 8
Prior to the waiver of sovereign immunity, courts developed a test
to distinguish a governmental function from a proprietary function or,
put another way, to decide whether an entity was "acting in a govern-
mental capacity.' 19 The test centered on whether the particular act was
done for the benefit of all, rather than for the advantage of the govern-
mental entity itself.20 In other words, the overarching question was
State, 68 Wash. 329, 332-40, 123 P. 450, 452-55 (1912) (same, regarding statutory authorization for
actions against state under REM. & BAL. CODE § 886).
13. See Billings, 27 Wash. at 293, 67 P. at 585; Riddoch, 68 Wash. at 332, 123 P. at 451.
14. See Abbott, supra note 2, at 316.
15. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895C, cmts. (1979); see also Kilbourn
v. City of Seattle, 43 Wash. 2d 373, 375-79, 261 P.2d 407, 408-10 (1953) (recognizing the dichot-
omy in Washington law with respect to availability of immunity to certain entities, with immunity
deemed abrogated by statute as to counties and school districts, but not as to municipal corporations
such as cities and towns).
16. See Kilbourn, 43 Wash. 2d at 377, 261 P.2d at 409.
17. Riddoch, 68 Wash. at 334, 123 P. at 452; Kelso v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wash. 2d 913, 916-
17, 390 P.2d 2, 5 (1964).
18. See Hagerman v. City of Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 698-99, 66 P.2d 1152, 1154-55 (1937);
see also Abbott, supra note 2, at 313, 315-16.
19. Hagerman, 189 Wash. at 697, 66 P.2d at 1154.
20. Abbott, supra note 2, at 317; Simpson v. Whatcom, 33 Wash. 393, 395-96, 74 P. 577, 578
(1903).
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whether the particular activity was undertaken for the common good.21
Under this standard, a city or town performing a proprietary function was
liable for its tortious acts to the same extent as a private corporation.
While this criteria appears to be simple and straightforward, it proved to
be difficult to apply. As in other jurisdictions, Washington's early case
law revealed inconsistencies in the application of the governmental-
proprietary dichotomy.22
The common law distinction between governmental and proprietary
functions became obsolete once the Washington legislature waived sov-
ereign immunity for state and local governmental entities. Nevertheless,
this historical distinction has some lingering relevance because of the
language later used by the legislature to describe the breadth of the
waiver of sovereign immunity.23
B. Other Common Law Immunities
During the era of sovereign immunity in Washington and elsewhere
other less-encompassing common law immunities also existed, although
they did not receive the full attention of the courts until after the veil of
sovereign immunity was lifted. These immunities corresponded to cer-
tain core functions performed by the legislative, judicial, and executive
branches of government. 24 While legislative and judicial immunity each
bear the name of the branch affected, the immunity for the executive
branch is often referred to as "discretionary immunity." 25 Understanda-
bly, there was no need to widely discuss legislative, judicial, and discre-
tionary immunities while sovereign immunity reigned because sovereign
21. Hagerman, 189 Wash. at 699, 66 P.2d at 1154-55. In Hagerman, the court described the
nature of a municipal corporation's governmental, as opposed to proprietary, function:
It is quite apparent that there are certain kinds of public service that only the government
can adequately perform. First among these are the administration of justice, the mainte-
nance of peace by the enforcement of the law, the protections of persons and property
against the ravages of fire, and the preservation of the public health against sickness and
disease. It is in these fields that the principle of immunity from torts has its widest appli-
cation and place.
189 Wash. at 699, 66 P.2d at 1154-55. This distinction was not applied to the state. See Riddoch, 68
Wash. at 334-35, 123 P. at 452; see generally Harper et al., supra note 2 § 29.4, at 615.
22. For example, street repair was considered proprietary, but operation of a health department
truck on the streets by a city employee was not. Hagerman, 189 Wash. at 701-04, 66 P.2d at 1155-
56 (collecting cases); see generally Fowler, supra note 2 § 29.6, at 620 ("[tlhe American rules gov-
erning the tort liability of municipal corporations make a curious patchwork of immunity and re-
sponsibility").
23. See infra Part 11.
24. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B, cmt. c (1979); Evangelical
United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 253, 407 P.2d 440, 444 (1965) (discussed infra
Part 111); Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wash. 2d 582, 588-89, 664 P.2d 492, 497-98 (1983).
25. Bender, 99 Wash. 2d at 588-89, 664 P.2d at 497-98.
2006]
Seattle University Law Review
immunity was all-encompassing: a claim of sovereign immunity neces-
sarily subsumed conduct giving rise to each of the narrower immunities.
Legislative immunity provides that a legislature and its members
cannot be held responsible in tort for merely passing a statute that causes
injury to a person.2 6 Similarly, judicial officers (and quasi-judicial offi-
cers) are not subject to tort liability for fulfilling their adjudicative func-
tions.27 In turn, discretionary immunity insulates members of the execu-
tive branch from tort liability with regard to the implementation of
laws. 28 Generally conceived, discretionary immunity is confined to con-
duct at the policy-making level, as opposed to the ministerial level. The
American Law Institute noted the following:
[W]ithin the scope of the executive branch are many agencies, offi-
cers and employees that are merely administrative. The State does
not retain immunity for all of the acts or omissions that they per-
form. It is only when the conduct involves the determination offun-
damental governmental policy and is essential to the realization of
that policy, and when it requires "the exercise of basic policy
evaluation, judgment and expertise" that the immunity should have
application. Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna v. State,
(1965) 67 Wash. 2d 246, 255, 407 P.2d 440, 445. The purpose of
the immunity is "to ensure that courts refuse to pass judgment on
policy decisions in the province of coordinate branches of govern-
ment... [if] such a policy decision, consciously balancing risks and
advantages, took place." Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 361
29(Cal. 1968).
As discussed below, when the Washington legislature waived sov-
ereign immunity, the policy-based discretionary immunity doctrine be-
came a major focus of attention for the courts in determining when
wrongful governmental conduct could be deemed tortious.3 °
III. THE WASHINGTON LEGISLATURE'S STEADFAST ADHERENCE
TO A BROAD WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Midway through the twentieth century, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was under serious attack. Its feudal origins were questioned, as
was its stated rationale-that the doctrine was necessary to avoid under-
mining governmental interests and depleting public resources. 31 Courts
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B, cmt. c (1979).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at cmt. d. (emphasis added).
30. See infra Part 1II.
31. See Fowler, supra note 2 §§ 29.1-4, at 596-620.
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and commentators recognized sound policy reasons for extending the
deterrent, compensatory, and loss distribution functions of tort law to the
state and local governmental entities.32 In 1953, the Washington Supreme
Court noted that case law and legal commentary reflected a "growing
demand" for legislation imposing government accountability in tort.33
In 1961, the Washington legislature exercised its power under
art. II, § 26 of the state constitution and categorically directed the manner
in which suits may be brought against the state: "The state of Washing-
ton, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, hereby
consents to the maintaining of a suit or action against it for damages aris-
ing out of its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private
person or corporation. 34
Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 4.92.090 was immediately
perceived as abolishing the state's sovereign immunity.35 However, be-
cause the judiciary had not previously viewed consent to maintaining a
suit or action as being equivalent to a waiver of sovereign immunity,
there were some lingering questions whether this statutory language truly
achieved this result. 36 But all misgivings about the legislature's intent
were soon put to rest by the 1963 amendment to the same statute: "The
state of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary
capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to
the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation." 37
In two cases decided shortly after these legislative pronouncements,
the state supreme court interpreted RCW 4.92.090 as abolishing the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity in Washington, including any derivative
immunity previously available to certain local governmental entities.38
32. Fowler, supra note 2 § 29.3 at 603-04.
33. See Kilbourn v. Seattle, 43 Wash. 2d 373, 376, 261 P.2d 407, 408 (1953).
34. Act of March 16, 1961, ch. 136, 1961 Wash. Sess. Laws 1680 (codified as WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.92.090 (2004)). This enactment did not include a statement of legislative intent. Further,
neither the House of Representatives nor the Washington Senate Journals reveal any legislative
history bearing on the underlying motivation for providing for government tort liability in Washing-
ton. The legislature's archives do not contain any bill reports that might explain precisely what moti-
vated the legislature to waive sovereign immunity.
35. See Abbott, supra note 2, at 318, 323.
36. Abbott, supra note 2, at 318-22; see also Billings v. State, 27 Wash. 288, 291-92, 67 P.
583, 584 (1902); Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash. 329, 340, 123 P. 450, 454-55 (1912).
37. Act of March 25, 1963, ch. 159, 1963 Wash. Sess. Laws 753 (codified as amended at
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (2004)) (emphasis added).
38. See Kelso v. Tacoma, 63 Wash. 2d 913, 916-19, 390 P.2d 2, 5-6 (1964) (holding 1961 act
waived derivative sovereign immunity of local governmental entities); Evangelical United Brethren
Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 252, 407 P.2d 440, 443 (1965) (holding, based upon 1961 enact-
ment, that "the legislature intended to abolish on a broad basis the doctrine of sovereign tort immu-
nity in this state"); Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 262, 407 P.2d at 449 (Finley, J., dissenting) (noting
that the "1963 amendment was apparently enacted in the light of widespread judicial unwillingness
to sound the final death knell for the archaic concept of sovereign immunity").
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Recognition that the waiver applied to local government entities made
particular sense: their immunity necessarily flowed from the immunity of
the state itself.39 Therefore, if the state's immunity was waived, then so
was theirs. In 1967, the legislature codified the extent of the waiver of
sovereign immunity vis-6-vis local governmental entities:
All political subdivisions, municipal corporations, and quasi mu-
nicipal corporations of the state, whether acting in a governmental
or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of
their tortious conduct, or the tortious conduct of their officers,
agents, or employees to the same extent as if they were a private
person or corporation .... 40
The Washington legislature's waiver of sovereign immunity is one
of the broadest in the country. 41 However, the waiver is not without limi-
tations. Rather, the waiver contains some procedural limitations, includ-
ing provisions in the 1963 act requiring notice of claims, restricting exe-
cution on judgments, and providing for a specific fund from which pay-
ment of claims and judgments must be made.42 More importantly, the
1961 and 1963 waiver provisions require that claims against the state
must arise out of "tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a pri-
vate person or corporation. ' ' 3 The legislature did not define this clause,
leaving it to the courts to determine its meaning. In particular, because
"tortious" is a common law concept, the courts would determine whether
the less-encompassing common law immunities for legislative, judicial,
and discretionary acts still remained and whether those immunities could
be raised by governmental entities to defeat tort liability.4 4
In the years since the Washington legislature waived sovereign
immunity, it has, on occasion, partially restored immunity for certain
39. Riddoch, 68 Wash. at 334-35, 123 P. at 452-53.
40. Act of March 21, 1967, ch. 164, 1967 Wash. Sess. Laws 792 (codified as WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.96.010 (2004)).
41. See Tardif & McKenna, supra note 5, at 2; see also Abbott, supra note 2, at 316; Evangeli-
cal, 67 Wash. 2d at 252, 407 P.2d at 443.
42. See Act of March 25, 1963, ch. 159, 1963 Wash. Sess. Laws 753-54 (codified as WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 4.92.100-. 110 (2004)) (requiring notice of claim against state and establishing proce-
dure for filing claims); Id. at 754-55 (codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.040 (2004)) (prohibiting
execution of any judgment against state and providing for method of paying judgments from state
treasury); Id. at 754 (codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.130 (2004)) (providing for funding source
for payment ofjudgments).
43. Act of March 16, 1961, ch. 136, 1961 Wash. Sess. Laws 1680 (codified as WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.92.090 (2004)); Act of March 25, 1963, ch. 159, 1963 Wash. Sess. Laws 753 (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (2004)). Similar language is found in the 1967 enactment
regarding waiver as to local governmental entities. See Act of March 21, 1967, ch. 164, 1967 Wash.
Sess. Laws 792 (codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 4.96.010 (2004)).
44. See Abbott, supra note 2, at 323-24.
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types of conduct when it found sufficient justification.45 However, the
legislature has not retreated whatsoever from the notion of a broad
waiver of sovereign immunity. In fact, the opposite is true. Perhaps the
most comprehensive legislation after 1967 bearing upon government li-
ability was enacted merely to refine the state risk management program
by enhancing preventative measures for the stated purpose of diminish-
ing civil liability exposure.4 6 In undertaking this measure, the legislature
clearly recognized the weight of additional civil liability on the state as a
result of the waiver. Even so, the legislature did not re-examine the wis-
dom of the waiver, instead choosing to address the problem by improv-
ing risk management strategies:
In recent years the [S]tate of Washington has experienced signifi-
cant increases in public liability claims. It is the intent of the Legis-
lature to reduce tort claim costs by restructuring Washington State's
risk management program to place more accountability on state
agencies, to establish an actuarially sound funding mechanism for
paying legitimate claims, when they occur, and to establish an ef-
fective safety and loss control program. 47
This 1989 legislation suggests a legislature resolute in its commit-
ment to government accountability. Since then, the legislature has stead-
fastly adhered to its broad waiver of sovereign immunity and has contin-
ued to focus on preventative measures designed to minimize the state's
tort liability exposure and related costs. 48 As will be seen in the next sec-
tion, during this same period, the Washington courts have faithfully hon-
ored the legislature's intent in waiving sovereign immunity, while also
clarifying the application of remaining common law immunities that
necessarily limit government tort liability.
45. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 46.44.020 (2004) (relieving state and other governmental
entities of liability by reason of any damage or injury due to the existence of a structure over a public
highway where vertical clearance is 14 feet or more); Id. § 9.94A.843 (providing conditional immu-
nity to state for release of information regarding sex offenders); Id. § 35.21.415 (providing qualified
immunity for officials and employees of cities and towns relating to responsibilities for electrical
utilities, but not for cities and towns); Id. § 4.24.210 (providing qualified immunity to private and
public landowners making their property available for recreational activities).
46. Act of May 13, 1989, ch. 419, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 2270 (codified as amended at
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92 (2004)).
47. See id. (emphasis added)
48. See generally Act of April 3, 2002, 2002 Wash. Sess. Laws 1693 (codified as amended at
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92 (2004)) (amending risk management statutes).
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IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF GOVERNMENT
TORT LIABILITY IN WASHINGTON FOLLOWING
THE WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A central theme in Tardif and McKenna's call for Washington to
re-examine its waiver of sovereign immunity is the assertion that judicial
interpretation of the waiver expanded the scope of government tort liabil-
ity beyond both the language of the statutory waiver and the Washington
Supreme Court's decision in Evangelical United Bretheren Church of
Adna v. State.49 However, this assertion cannot withstand scrutiny. Since
Evangelical, Washington courts have consistently interpreted the waiver
of sovereign immunity as imposing liability for only "tortious conduct;"
but the courts have also consistently recognized that other distinct com-
mon law immunities and judicial doctrines still protect essential acts of
governing and shield governmental entities from unlimited civil liabil-
ity. 5°
This Part surveys key Washington case law regarding government
liability, beginning with an examination of Evangelical and how Tardif
and McKenna misread that decision. It then explains how later cases
have adhered to and clarified Evangelical's analysis, emphasizing that
the common law immunities at issue in Evangelical-judicial, legislative,
and discretionary immunity-are rooted in separation of powers princi-
ples. Finally, this Part identifies the development of the public duty doc-
trine as a related judicial construct for distinguishing tortious from non-
tortious conduct.
A. The Evangelical Decision
Evangelical was the first major decision to interpret the scope of
government liability following the waiver of sovereign immunity. In
Evangelical, the Washington Supreme Court considered the scope of
tortious conduct for which the State was not immune under RCW
4.92.090.51 According to the court,
the legislative, judicial, and purely executive processes of govern-
ment, including as well the essential quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial or discretionary acts and decisions within the framework of
such processes, cannot and should not, from the standpoint of public
policy and the maintenance of the integrity of our system of gov-
49. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965); see Tardif & McKenna, supra note 5, at 6-7, 15-
31.
50. See supra Part III.
51. Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 253, 407 P.2d at 444.
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emment, be characterized as tortious however unwise, unpopular,
mistaken, or neglectful a particular decision or act might be. 
2
The plaintiffs in Evangelical asserted four principal claims of liabil-
ity against the state arising out of a fire set by a youth who had escaped
from a state juvenile facility for children with behavior problems.53 The
plaintiffs alleged the state was negligent in 1) maintaining an "open pro-
gram" at the facility, which allowed youths a substantial degree of free-
dom; 2) placing the boy in question in the open program; 3) assigning the
boy to a boiler room work detail, given his proclivity for setting fires;
and 4) failing to timely notify local law enforcement following the boy's
escape.5 4 The state countered that none of its actions could be regarded as
tortious conduct subject to the waiver of sovereign immunity because
they involved the exercise of administrative judgment and discretion.55
In addressing the plaintiffs' claims, the court recognized the need
"to determine where, in the area of governmental processes, orthodox
tort liability stops and the act of governing begins. 56 The court thus
drew a distinction between tortious conduct, which is subject to civil li-
ability since the waiver of sovereign immunity, and immunized conduct,
which the court described as "discretionary," a term associated with
purely executive processes that are comparable to the protected processes
of the judicial and legislative branches. 57 Having drawn this distinction,
the court considered various tests for separating discretionary from tor-
tious conduct, including distinguishing between "planning" and "opera-
tional" decisions as under the Federal Tort Claims Act.58 The point of
such distinction is captured in U.S. Supreme Court Justice Jackson's ob-
servation in Dalehite v. United States that "it is not a tort for government
to govem." 59
The Washington Supreme Court ultimately adopted its own test
based upon a series of questions intended to help distinguish "truly dis-
cretionary acts" from potentially tortious conduct:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily
involve a basic governmental policy, program, or objective? (2)
Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the reali-
zation or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective
52. Id. (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 252, 407 P.2d at 443.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 253, 407 P.2d at 444.
57. Id. at 253, 258, 407 P.2d at 444, 446-47.
58. Id. at 253-54, 407 P.2d at 444.
59. 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 253, 407
P.2d at 444.
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as opposed to one which would not change the course or direc-
tion of the policy, program, or objective? (3) Does the act, omis-
sion, or decision require the exercise of basic policy evaluation,
judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency
involved? (4) Does the governmental agency involved possess
the requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and
duty to do or make the challenged act, omission, or decision? 60
In view of these questions, the court assessed the plaintiffs' four
separate allegations of tort liability and concluded that, as to the first two
allegations, the state could not be held liable for the agency decision to
create the open program at the juvenile facility or for the review board's
decision to place the particular youth in that program. 61 These policy-
based decisions were "not unlike those called for in the legislative and
judicial processes of government," about which "widely divergent opin-
ions can and do exist." 62 Furthermore, the decisions involved the balanc-
ing of competing policy objectives "between therapy and security." 63 In
particular, the review board's placement decision was viewed as analo-
gous to the decision of a parole board to release an inmate from a mental
hospital, a decision that the court had previously recognized as quasi-
judicial in character.64 It appears it was this liability theory the court had
in mind when it concluded that the plaintiffs' first two contentions in-
volved acts that were "purely discretionary, if not in fact quasi-judicial in
nature., 65
In contrast, the court held that the state could be subject to tort li-
ability on the plaintiffs' second two claims-for the managerial decision
to assign the youth to the boiler room detail and for any failure to timely
notify law enforcement of his escape.66 While these acts did involve
some degree of discretion in implementing the program in question, they
were not "essential to the realization or attainment of the basic policies
and objectives of the delinquent youth program of the state."67 Rather,
the acts involved merely ministerial processes incidental to the day-to-
day operation of the facility. 68
Tardif and McKenna, however, read Evangelical as interpreting the
waiver of sovereign immunity to exclude liability for all "governmental
60. Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 255,407 P.2d at 445 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 258, 407 P.2d at 446-47.
62. Id. at 258, 407 P.2d at 447.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing Emery v. Littlejohn, 83 Wash. 334, 145 P. 423 (1915)).
65. Id. at 259, 407 P.2d at 447.
66. Id.
67. Id. (emphasis added)
68. Id.
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functions., 69 They state, "Evangelical was a seminal case because it in-
terpreted the private liability limitation in the waiver as excluding gov-
ernmental functions from liability. Evangelical was significant because it
immunized not only policymaking, but also operational steps taken by
officials to implement policy. ' 70
This interpretation misapprehends the Court's holding. First, Evan-
gelical did not purport to interpret the scope of the waiver of sovereign
immunity at all. The court gave every indication of accepting the all-
encompassing language of the 1961 act as to tortious conduct, whether in
a "governmental or proprietary capacity.",71 Instead, the court focused on
the common law limits on tortious conduct vis-6-vis governmental enti-
ties when it stated, "it is not a tort for government to govern." 72 Thus, the
court recognized that the legislative, judicial, and certain executive proc-
esses of government cannot be tortious. These common law immunities
for judicial or quasi-judicial acts, legislative or quasi-legislative acts, and
purely executive or discretionary acts were well-established prior to the
waiver of sovereign immunity, but they only gained relevance after the
state lost its more-encompassing sovereign immunity.73
Second, Tardif and McKenna misread Evangelical as suggesting
that operational or managerial acts taken by officials to implement policy
are subject to common law discretionary immunity.74 In this regard, they
criticize the Evangelical opinion for containing an "internal inconsis-
tency," insofar as the court finds no liability for the review board deci-
sion placing the youth in the open program, but finds potential liability
for the facility's assignment of the youth to the boiler room detail.75
When Tardif and McKenna describe this aspect of the decision as an in-
consistency, they appear to misunderstand why the former decision in-
volved basic policymaking, but the latter did not.
The initial placement of the youth in the open program involved a
discretionary, quasi-judicial decision, made by an initial review board
that had to balance the statutory policy goals of community safety and
rehabilitation of the youth.76 The legislature granted the responsible
agency the discretion to establish and maintain programs to carry out the
69. Tardif & McKenna, supra note 5, at 11.
70. Id.
71. See Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 252, 407 P.2d at 443.
72. Id. at 253, 407 P.2d at 444 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953)
(Jackson, J., dissenting)).
73. See id.
74. Tardif & McKenna, supra note 5, at 11, 15-16, 43-44, 50-51.
75.Id. at 11.
76. Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 257-58, 407 P.2d at 446-47.
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statutory policy objectives. 77 Within this framework, the decision that
placement of a particular youth in the open program would best balance
the twin policy aims of security and rehabilitation involved a basic policy
judgment, akin to the quasi-judicial decision a parole board makes in
deciding whether to grant parole to a particular person.78
In contrast, the decision to assign the youth to work the boiler room
detail was merely a managerial decision implementing established policy
in the day-to-day assignment of youths to work details. 79 As such, this
decision was capable of being measured against established procedures
and standards of care and was subject to generally applicable tort law
analysis, including the foreseeability of harm. 80 Properly understood,
there is no internal inconsistency in the court's decision in Evangelical.
Tardif & McKenna find an inconsistency because they erroneously
read the decision to interpret the waiver of sovereign immunity "as ex-
cluding governmental functions from liability,"8 1 especially "the opera-
tional steps taken by officials to implement policy. ' '82 In fact, the Evan-
gelical court drew no distinction between governmental and non-
governmental functions. Rather, the court drew a distinction between
high-level policymaking and low-level operational acts to implement
policy. It is true that all of these functions are "governmental" in some
sense. But in finding potential tort liability for day-to-day management
decisions, including assignment of the youth to the boiler room detail,
the court recognized that there was no immunity for "operational," "min-
isterial," or "housekeeping" functions.83 Discretionary immunity is thus
confined to those "decisions which are essential to the realization or at-
tainment of the basic policies and objectives of the delinquent youth pro-
gram of the state., 84 In sum, the court appreciated the difference between
the essential government formulation of "basic policies and objectives"
and the merely operational "internal management" decisions made by
government officials. 85
The Washington Supreme Court's decision in Evangelical was piv-
otal because it established the framework for understanding the interplay
between the legislature's broad waiver of sovereign immunity and the
77. See id. at 257, 407 P.2d at 446.
78. Id. at 258, 407 P.2d at 447; see also Taggart v. State, 118 Wash. 2d 195, 205-07, 822 P.2d
243, 248 (1992) (noting quasi-judicial immunity of parole boards).
79. Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 259-60, 407 P.2d at 447-48.
80. Id. at 260, 407 P.2d at 447-48.
81. Tardif & McKenna, supra note 5, at 11.
82. Id.
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pre-existing common law immunities for basic judicial, legislative, and
executive functions. As discussed below, cases since Evangelical have
not departed from this framework, but rather have clarified the line be-
tween high-level policymaking and merely managerial acts, making clear
that the policymaking/operational distinction is rooted in separation of
powers principles.
B. Refinement of the Evangelical Decision
As Evangelical foreshadowed, courts were presented with a variety
of new tort claims for government conduct following the waiver of sov-
ereign immunity. Consequently, judicial decisions continued to revisit
and refine the scope of government liability. Tardif and McKenna sug-
gest that later key cases departed from Evangelical's initial interpretation
of the waiver of sovereign immunity and expanded government liability
beyond "traditional" liabilities. 6 However, this argument misapprehends
the holding in Evangelical, as previously discussed. 87 In fact, the key
cases that Tardif and McKenna criticize are not only consistent with
Evangelical, but they have also helped to clarify the sometimes fine line
between high-level policymaking and low-level operational decisions.
A series of cases beginning with King v. City of Seattle in 1974
were instrumental in furthering the analysis in Evangelical.88 These cases
underscore that the Evangelical court's reasoning is founded upon the
doctrine of separation of powers. For example, in King, the court noted
that "immunity for 'discretionary' activities serves no purpose except to
assure that courts refuse to pass judgment on policy decisions in the
province of coordinate branches of government." 89 This statement is con-
sistent with the generally understood "main idea" behind discretionary
immunity; namely, that "certain governmental activities are legislative or
executive in nature[, and] any judicial control of those activities, in tort
suits or otherwise, would disrupt the balanced separation of powers of
86. Tardif& McKenna, supra note 5, at 15-16.
87. See supra Part III.A.
88. See King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 246-47, 525 P.2d 228, 232-33 (1974) (hold-
ing city not immune from liability for arbitrary and capricious decision not to issue permits); see also
Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash. 2d 321, 328-29, 534 P.2d 1360, 1365 (1975) (finding no immunity for
discretion exercised "in the field" by police officers engaged in high-speed chase); Bender v. City of
Seattle, 99 Wash. 2d 582, 589-90, 664 P.2d 492, 498-90 (1983) (rejecting claim of discretionary
immunity for decisions made during criminal investigation, which, albeit "discretionary," were not
"basic policy decisions"); compare Cougar Bus. Owners Ass'n v. State, 97 Wash. 2d 466, 476, 647
P.2d 481, 486 (1982) (recognizing discretionary immunity for governor's decision regarding scope
and duration of restricted "red zone" designation following eruption of Mt. St. Helens), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 971 (1982).
89. King, 84 Wash. 2d at 246, 525 P.2d at 233.
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the three branches of government." 90 Both before and since the waiver of
sovereign immunity, tort litigation has been unable to scrutinize the basic
activities of governing, including executive, legislative, and judicial
functions. The legislature's broad waiver of sovereign immunity did not
alter this fact. 91
Separation of powers principles led to the four questions posed by
the court in Evangelical.92 These questions distinguish between high-
level policy decisions and low-level implementation-of-policy decisions
made by executive branch officials. The point of inquiry is not simply
whether government officials exercised some discretion in the perform-
ance of their duties, but whether such discretion embodied basic policy
decision-making. Applying the Evangelical framework, the court in Ma-
son v. Bitton noted the following:
To now hold that this type of discretion, exercised by police officers
in the field, cannot result in liability under RCW 46.61.035 [emer-
gency vehicle statute], due to an exception provided for basic policy
discretion, would require this court to close its eyes to the clear in-
tent and purpose of the legislature when it abolished sovereign im-
munity under RCW 4.92.090. If this type of conduct were immune
from liability, the exception would surely engulf the rule, if not to-
tally destroy it.9 3
Emphasizing the separation of powers concerns that guided the de-
cision in Evangelical, cases such as Mason have helped refine the discre-
tionary immunity doctrine in a way that respects the legislature's waiver
of sovereign immunity. These cases emphasize that imposing liability for
merely managerial, operational, or ministerial functions does not impli-
cate separation of powers concerns because these activities do not in-
volve policymaking by a coordinate branch of government. Rather, such
managerial acts involve merely the implementation of policy and may
therefore be measured according to ordinary tort principles, including
established standards of care. Just as the court in Evangelical was able to
assess a basic managerial decision (assigning the youth to the boiler
room detail) according to the standard of a reasonable supervisor, later
courts have recognized tort liability when governmental decisions were
90. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 131, at 1039 (5th ed. 1984).
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B, cmts. c-d (1979) (recognizing it is not a
tort for a court to wrongly decide a case or for the legislature to pass a bad law); see also Abbott,
supra note 2, at 323-24; ("it would be unthinkable, for example, to hold the state liable for the
wrong decision of a judge or legislator"); see generally, KEETON ET AL., supra note 90, § 131.
92. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 255, 407 P.2d 440, 445 (1966); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 895B, cmt. d (1979) (citing Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 253, 407 P.2d at 444).
93. 85 Wash. 2d at 328-29, 534 P.2d at 1365 (1975).
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subject to definable standards of care.94 For example, later courts have
held that government activity such as roadway design, maintenance, and
signage is readily subject to ordinary negligence theories. 95 Even before
the waiver of sovereign immunity, courts recognized that liability in this
area was amenable to traditional negligence analysis.
96
In contrast, courts cannot assess basic policy decisions against tort
standards of "reasonableness." For example, a local business association
sued Washington Governor Dixie Lee Ray based on her declaration of a
state of emergency during the eruption of Mt. St. Helens in 1980.97 One
cannot imagine that a court hearing such a case would allow an "expert"
governor from a neighboring state to testify how a reasonable governor
would respond to a volcanic eruption in order to establish whether Gov-
ernor Ray acted negligently on that occasion. On the contrary, so long as
authorized by statute or constitutional provision, basic policy decisions
of this sort are appropriately regarded as immune from judicial second-
guessing through the medium of a tort duty analysis. 98 Similarly, political
judgments are by nature open to dispute, and judicial review of such de-
cisions might improperly "operate to make the judiciary the final and
supreme arbiter in government, not only on a constitutional level, but on
all matters on which judgment might differ."99 For this reason, Evangeli-
cal and subsequent cases have carefully defined the distinction between
policymaking and operational decisions.
94. See, e.g., Miotke v. Spokane, 101 Wash. 2d 307, 336-47, 678 P.2d 803, 819-20 (1984)
(decision to build sewage bypass was not basic policy decision where measured against technical,
engineering, and scientific judgment); Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wash. 2d
107, 158, 744 P.2d 1032, 1055 (1987) (distinguishing between arguably immune decision to under-
take nuclear power project versus technical means by which decision was implemented, subject to
scrutiny under ordinary tort principles).
95. See Stewart v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 285, 294, 597 P.2d 101, 106-07 (1979) (holding that,
while decision to build freeway involved basic policy decision, choices as to design and lighting
were not protected by discretionary immunity); Riley v. Burlington Northern, 27 Wash. App. 11, 18
n.4, 615 P.2d 516, 519 n.4 (rejecting discretionary immunity for decision regarding roadway signing
at railroad crossing), review denied, 94 Wash. 2d 1021, 615 P.2d 516 (1980); Ruff v. County of
King, 125 Wash. 2d 697, 704-05, 887 P.2d 886, 889-90 (1995) (noting common law duty to exer-
cise ordinary care in maintaining safe roadways). In appropriate circumstances, negligence may be
established by reference to the standards set forth in the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices
(MUTCD). See Ottis Holwegner Trucking v. Moser, 72 Wash. App. 114, 122, 863 P.2d 609, 614
(1993) (noting that the"[f]ailure to comply with uniform state traffic control standards can be evi-
dence of negligence"); cf Kitt v. Yakima County, 93 Wash. 2d 670, 676-76, 611 P.2d 1234, 1237
(1980) (holding that violation of mandatory MUTCD provision constitutes negligence per se).
96. See Hewitt v. City of Seattle, 62 Wash. 377, 378-79, 113 P. 1084, 1085-86 (1911).
97. See Cougar Bus. Owners Ass'n v. State, 97 Wash. 2d 466, 647 P.2d 481 (1982), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982).
98. Id. at 471-73, 647 P.2d at 484-85 (holding governor's actions protected by discretionary
immunity; applying four part test of Evangelical).
99. KEETON ET AL., supra note 90 § 131, at 1039.
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Rather than recognizing the separation of powers principles that
undergird the analysis in Evangelical, Tardif and McKenna view the de-
cision as interpreting discretionary immunity to embrace "governmental
functions," including "operational steps." 100 As will be seen, this inter-
pretation of discretionary immunity erroneously reflects the former"governmental-proprietary" dichotomy that was expressly discarded by
the legislature when it waived sovereign immunity.
C. Discretionary Immunity Does Not Embrace
All "Governmental Functions"
As discussed above, courts have recognized that governmental
functions are subject to tort liability when they do not involve high-level
policymaking. This view is consistent with the legislative waiver of sov-
ereign immunity for both governmental and proprietary acts, and it is
true regardless of whether the activity in question is one that only the
government performs, such as licensing drivers or designing and main-
taining public roads 11 Tardif and McKenna's suggestion that such ac-
tivities were not intended to be subject to the waiver of sovereign immu-
nity because they involve basic governmental functions does not accord
with the language of the waiver statutes.0 2 Both RCW 4.92.090 and
4.96.010 waive sovereign immunity of the state and local governmental
entities whether acting in a "governmental or proprietary capacity.' 0 3
Tardif and McKenna discuss the pre-waiver distinction between govern-
mental and propriety functions of municipal corporations 104 and argue
that the discretionary immunity analysis in Evangelical essentially car-
ries forward this distinction.' 0 5
As noted, however, the distinction between governmental and pro-
prietary functions arose prior to the waiver of sovereign immunity as a
way to identify those activities of certain municipal corporations in
which the municipality partook in the state's sovereignty, ergo in the
state's immunity. 106 Courts attempted to draw the line between functions
100. Tardif & McKenna, supra note 5, at 11.
101. See, e.g., LaPlante v. State, 85 Wash. 2d 154, 531 P.2d 299 (1975) (involving negligent
licensing of taxi driver); Stewart v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 285, 597 P.2d 101 (1979) (involving negli-
gent roadway design).
102. See Tardif & McKenna, supra note 5, at 11, 17, 42, 50-51.
103. See Act of March 16, 1961, ch. 136, 1961 Wash. Sess. Laws 1680 (codified as WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (2004)); Act of March 21, 1967, ch. 164, 1967 Wash. Sess. Laws 792 (codi-
fied as WASH. REV. CODE § 4.96.010 (2004)).
104. See Tardif & McKenna, supra note 5, at 5-7.
105. See id. at 10-12, 50-51.
106. Hagerman v. City of Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 698-99, 66 P.2d 1152, 1154-55 (1937);
Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash. 329, 334, 123 P. 450, 452 (1912); see also Kelso v. Tacoma, 63 Wash.
2d 913, 916-17, 390 P.2d 2, 5 (1964); Abbott, supra note 2, at 313, 315-16. See supra Part I.A.
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a municipality performed as a subdivision of the state, which were im-
mune by virtue of state sovereignty, versus those proprietary functions
the municipality performed on behalf of itself, which were subject to tort
liability. °7 Pre-waiver cases drew no distinction between high-level, ba-
sic policy decisions and merely operational decisions of the governmen-
tal entity.10 8 Nor was the analysis necessarily concerned with whether the
function involved an activity analogous to that performed by a private
corporation.' 0 9 The pre-waiver cases make clear that proprietary func-
tions for which a political subdivision could be held liable in tort often
involved matters of substantial discretion as well as activities for which
no private counterpart was apparent.' 10 Immunity for governmental func-
tions, on the other hand, extended only as far as the state's sovereign
immunity and went by the wayside with the waiver of sovereign immu-
nity in 1961.1"
Thus, by the time the court decided Evangelical, it did so in the
context of the legislature's categorical waiver of the state's sovereign
immunity, which rendered obsolete the former governmental-proprietary
distinction. 1 2 Tardif and McKenna's unsupported assertion that Evan-
gelical interpreted the waiver "as excluding governmental functions from
liability,""' 3 is a misreading of the court's opinion. As explained previ-
ously,11 4 the Evangelical court was concerned with interpreting the term
"tortious conduct" in RCW 4.92.090, and it held that essential acts of
governing embodied in basic policy decisions cannot be deemed tor-
tious.115 This holding reflected separation of powers concerns that neces-
sarily limit tort liability, notwithstanding the otherwise categorical
waiver of sovereign immunity." 16 Indeed, it would have been anomalous
for the court to hearken back to the former governmental-propriety dis-
tinction, given its recognition that RCW 4.92.090 waived immunity for
governmental functions." 7
107. See Kelso, 63 Wash. 2d at 916-17, 390 P.2d at 5.
108. See id.
109. See Hagerman, 189 Wash. at 701-02, 66 P.2d at 1155-56.
110. See, e.g., McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953)
(holding school district liable for negligence resulting in rape of student); Berglund v. Spokane
County, 4 Wash. 2d 309, 103 P.2d 355 (1940) (recognizing tort liability for negligent road mainte-
nance, including failure to install sidewalk).
11. See Kelso, 63 Wash. 2d at 916-17, 390 P.2d at 5.
112. See Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 252-53, 407 P.2d
440,443-44 (1965).
113. Tardif& McKenna, supra note 5, at 11.
114. Seesupra Part III.A.
115. Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 253-54, 407 P.2d at 444.
116. Id. at 253-55, 407 P.2d at 444-45.
117. Id. at 252, 407 P.2d at 443.
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Moreover, in waiving sovereign immunity, the legislature con-
sented to imposition of liability against state and local governmental enti-
ties for tortious conduct "to the same extent as if [they] were a private
person or corporation."'"18 This language forecloses any reliance on the"governmental" nature of a particular activity as a basis for retaining
sovereign immunity. In this regard, it is appropriate when assessing li-
ability to draw analogies between the governmental defendant's conduct
and comparable conduct performed in the private sector. 119 For example,
the duty of a law enforcement officer may be analogized to that of a pri-
vate security officer under similar circumstances. 120 Notably, the statu-
tory language, "as if,''121 suggests that liability may be imposed even in
areas in which no prior analogous liability has been found in the private
sector, so long as a private entity would be subject to liability if the same
theory were asserted against it in the first instance. A more restrictive
analysis might have been required if the statutes imposed liability only
for conduct "performed by" or even "to the same extent as" private de-
fendants, rather than "as if... a private person or corporation."'1 22
Tardif and McKenna make the related assertion that the legislature
intended to impose liability only for "ordinary torts," such as negligent
driving or medical malpractice, which may be committed by public and
private actors alike.' 23 However, this assertion is out of keeping with
Washington case law and is unsupported by the language actually used
by the legislature. As the courts have properly recognized, the waiver
mandates that the sovereign mantle be disregarded so that governmental
entities are subject to the same tort duty analysis as if sovereign immu-
nity never existed.
118. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.92.090, 4.96.010 (2004). Although the majority opinion in Evan-
gelical only commented on the original 1961 enactment, the 1963 statute, which remains in force to
this day, has the same pivotal language. Compare Act of March 16, 1961, ch. 136, 1961 Wash. Sess.
Laws 1680 (codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (2004)), with Act of March 25, 1963, ch. 159,
1963 Wash. Sess. Laws 753 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (2004)). The
same language also appears in the 1967 enactment confirming the waiver of sovereign immunity as
to local governmental entities. Act of March 21, 1967, ch. 164, 1967 Wash. Sess. Laws 792 (codi-
fied as WASH. REV. CODE § 4.96.010 (2004)).
119. See Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 253, 407 P.2d at 444 (noting that tortious conduct "must
be analogous, in some degree at least, to the chargeable misconduct and liability of a private person
or corporation"); see also J & B Dev. Co. Inc. v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 310-11, 669 P.2d
468, 475 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring) (noting analysis involves analogizing to private sector duties),
overruled on other grounds; Taylor v. Stevens County, 11I Wash. 2d 159, 759 P.2d 447 (1988).
120. J & B Dev., 100 Wash. 2d at 311, 669 P.2d at 475 (Utter, J., concurring) (noting this
analogy and use of similar analysis in other states); see also Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 240-41
(Alaska 1976) (recognizing liability of public fire inspector as analogous to duty of private insurance
inspector).
121. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (2004).
122. Id.
123. See Tardif& McKenna, supra note 5, at 7, 17-18.
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This interpretation of the waiver is supported by the fact that gov-
ernmental defendants may not assert a defense to tort liability based on
limited financial resources. 2 4 While the legislature was evidently con-
cerned with the potential economic consequences of waiving sovereign
immunity, it addressed this concern through risk management programs
and by limiting the methods by which a tort victim may collect a judg-
ment against the state or its subdivisions. 2 5 In Bodin v. Stanwood, a ma-
jority of the supreme court, comprised of the concurring and dissenting
justices, properly rejected a municipality's argument that limited eco-
nomic resources may provide a defense against claims of negligence.
126
Though dicta in an earlier decision suggested that a governmental defen-
dant might have a defense based on funding limitations or budget alloca-
tions, 127 the holding in Bodin makes clear this is not the case. While a
governmental entity, just as a private person or corporation, may offer
certain cost evidence as bearing upon the exercise of reasonable care,
there is no generally available "poverty defense."'
' 28
Following Evangelical, judicial interpretation of the scope of gov-
ernment tort liability has respected the legislature's directive that state
and local governmental entities shall be liable for their tortious conduct,
both governmental and proprietary, to the same extent as if they were a
private person or corporation. At the same time, Washington courts have
honored the common law doctrines providing for judicial, legislative,
and discretionary immunity, consistent with the separation of powers
principle underlying these doctrines.
Against this backdrop, the courts have also struggled to identify the
sources of government tort duties, an inquiry that only became relevant
with the waiver of sovereign immunity. Most notably, the "public duty
doctrine" has emerged as an analytical framework for assessing the scope
of tort liability in particular contexts.
D. The Public Duty Doctrine
The public duty doctrine did not fully surface until after the waiver
of sovereign immunity (though it is inaccurate to suggest that the doc-
124. See id. at 23 n.151.
125. See Act of March 25, 1963, ch. 159, 1963 Wash. Sess. Laws 753-54 (codified as WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 4.92.100-. 110 (2004)) (requiring notice of claim against state and establishing proce-
dure for filing claims).
126. 130 Wash. 2d 726, 742-43, 927 P.2d 240, 250-51 (1996) (Alexander, J., concurring &
Johnson, J., dissenting) (majority rejecting so-called poverty defense).
127. See McCluskey v. Handorff-Sherman, 125 Wash. 2d 1, 8-9, 882 P.2d 157, 161 (1994);
see also Tardif& McKenna, supra note 5, at 23 n.151.
128. See Bodin, 130 Wash. 2d at 742, 927 P.2d at 250 (Alexander, J., concurring); id at 743,
927 P.2d at 250-51 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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trine arose out of dissatisfaction with the broad scope of the waiver). 2 9
Washington borrowed the public duty doctrine from a series of New
York cases involving government tort liability. 13 ° The basic rule ex-
pressed in the New York cases is that obligations imposed by statute or
municipal ordinance do not, in and of themselves, support tort liability.13'
In Washington, this rather unremarkable principle reflects traditional tort
duty analysis insofar as a statutory obligation is not generally regarded as
imposing tort liability unless courts recognize that the statute creates a
direct or implied cause of action. 32 This duty analysis only surfaces
when a statute, administrative code, or ordinance is asserted as the source
of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff-and significantly, this duty
analysis is equally applicable to both public and private defendants.' 33
Since first recognizing the public duty doctrine, the Washington
Supreme Court has described the doctrine and its exceptions as "focusing
tools" for determining whether a duty is owed "to a nebulous public or
whether that duty has focused on the claimant. ' 34 In some instances, the
court has applied basic tort principles to carve out broad exceptions to
the doctrine's rule of non-liability. 35 At the same time, the court has also
imposed liability, without reference to the public duty doctrine, for a
129. See Tardif & McKenna, supra note 5, at 48.
130. See Campbell v. Bellevue, 85 Wash. 2d 1, 9 n.5, 530 P.2d 234, 238-39 n.5 (1975).
131. See, e.g., Motyka v. Amsterdam, 204 N.E.2d 635, 636-37 (N.Y. 1965) (holding there is
no general liability to the public for failure to supply adequate police or fire protection); see also
Kelly Mahon Tullier, Note, Governmental Liability for Negligent Failure to Detain Drunk Drivers,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 887 (1992) (noting origins of public duty doctrine).
132. See Campbell, 85 Wash. 2d at 8-10, 530 P.2d at 238-39; see also Bennett v. Hardy, 113
Wash. 2d 912, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990) (recognizing implied cause of action for discrimination under
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.090 (2004), based on analysis of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
874A (1979)). In addition to a direct or implied statutory cause of action, the court has recognized
that a statute, ordinance, or the like may provide evidence of the standard of care for a common law
action. See, e.g., Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash. 2d 476, 480-82, 824 P.2d 483, 485-86 (1992) (recog-
nizing statutory standard of care under four-part test of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286
(1965)).
133. See Campbell, 85 Wash. 2d at 9-10, 530 P.2d. at 238-39. Application of this analysis to
private sector tort liability is evident in the New York cases discussed in Campbell. As explained in
Motyka, the landmark "public duty doctrine" case in New York involved a private defendant provid-
ing services to the city under a contract and the terms of an enabling statute. See Motyka, 204 N.E.2d
at 636-37 (citing H.R. Moch Co. Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y.1928)).
134. J & B Dev. Co. Inc. v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 304-05, 669 P.2d 468, 472
(1983); see also Bailey v. Forks, 108 Wash. 2d 262, 265-68, 737 P.2d 1257, 1259-60 (1987) (out-
lining public duty doctrine and exceptions).
135. Four exceptions to the doctrine have thus far been identified: "legislative intent," "special
relationship," "failure to enforce," and "rescue doctrine." See Bailey, 108 Wash. 2d at 268, 737 P.2d
at 1260; see also Taggart v. State, 118 Wash. 2d 195, 218, 822 P.2d 243, 254 (1992) (noting, "[t]he
question whether an exception to the public duty doctrine applies is thus another way of asking
whether the State had a duty to the plaintiff'); accord Bishop v. Miche, 137 Wash. 2d 518, 530, 973
P.2d 465, 471 (1999).
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governmental entity's breach of a common law duty not based on a statu-
tory obligation. 36
Over the years, both judges and commentators have expressed con-
cern that the public duty doctrine operates as a judicial restoration of
sovereign immunity in defiance of the legislature's waiver.1 37 Recently,
in response to such criticism and calls to abandon the public duty doc-
trine, the Washington Supreme Court clarified the doctrine's limited pur-
pose and scope.' 38 In Osborn v. Mason County, the court stated,
Because a public entity is liable in tort "to the same extent as if it
were a private person or corporation," former RCW 4.92.090 (1963)
and former 4.96.010 (1967) (municipality), the public duty doctrine
does not-cannot-provide immunity from liability. Rather it is a
"focusing tool" we use to determine whether a public entity owed a
duty to a "nebulous public" or a particular individual. The public
duty doctrine simply reminds us that a public entity-like any other
defendant-is liable for negligence only if it has a statutory or
common law duty of care. And its "exceptions" indicate when a
statutory or common law duty exists. "The question whether an ex-
ception to the public duty doctrine applies is thus another way of
asking whether the State has a duty to the plaintiff." In other words,
the public duty doctrine helps us distinguish proper legal duties
from mere hortatory "duties."'' 39
This reasoning confirms that the public duty doctrine is not a sub-
stitute for sovereign immunity, but is merely a part of traditional tort
analysis when an asserted duty is based on a statute, regulation, ordi-
136. See Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983) (holding action may lie for
State's negligent release of mentally disturbed patient); see also Taggart, 118 Wash. 2d at 218 n.4,
822 P.2d at 254-55 n.4 (1992) (noting that Petersen was later described as effectively creating ex-
ception to public duty doctrine).
137. See Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 290-95, 669 P.2d 451, 460-
63 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring) (urging that the doctrine detracts from traditional tort analysis);
Babcock v. Mason County Fire Dist. No. 6, 144 Wash. 2d 774, 795-802, 30 P.3d 1261, 1272-76
(2001) (Chambers, J., concurring) (criticizing doctrine); Beal v. City of Seattle, 134 Wash. 2d 769,
794, 954 P.2d 237, 249 (1998) (Talmadge, J., dissenting) (same); see also Mark McLean Meyers,
Comment, A Unified Approach to State and Municipal Tort Liability in Washington, 59 WASH. L.
REV. 533 (1984); Shelly K. Speir, Comment, The Public Duty Doctrine and Municipal Liability for
Negligent Administration of Zoning Codes, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 803 (1997). In response to criti-
cism, numerous jurisdictions have abandoned the public duty doctrine, while only two that have
addressed the issue have chosen to retain it. See Aaron R. Baker, Comment, Untangling the Public
Duty Doctrine, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 731, 747 nn. 111-12 (2005) (collecting cases).
138. See Cummins v. Lewis County, 156 Wash. 2d 844, 133 P.3d 458 (2006); Osborn v. Ma-
son County, 157 Wash. 2d 18, 134 P.3d 197 (2006). The Cummins court did not address whether the
public duty doctrine should be abandoned, concluding the issue had not properly been preserved by
the plaintiff.
139. 157 Wash. 2d at 27-28. 134 P.3d at 202 (citations omitted).
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nance, or the like. 40 Similarly, the doctrine's "exceptions" help define
those instances in which a defendant's actions toward a particular person
or class of persons may give rise to a duty in tort. 141 With this clarifica-
tion in Osborn, the Washington Supreme Court has properly defined the
tort duties of governmental entities in accord with prior case law, which
has consistently imposed government liability except in narrow circum-
stances involving essential acts of governing. 142 Thus, Osborn has
brought stability to the law.
Ultimately, the past four decades have seen positive growth in the
understanding of the scope of government tort liability following the leg-
islature's mandate. During this time, the law has not drifted away from
the intent of the waiver statutes and the decision in Evangelical. Rather,
as the law has developed, it has accomplished the goal of holding the
state and local governments accountable for their tortious conduct to the
same extent as if they were private actors. At the same time, the law has
maintained its respect for the rights of state and local governments to
govern. Though the incremental refinements that naturally occur in the
development of case law have produced some ebb and flow in the scope
of government tort liability in particular areas, the Washington Supreme
Court has consistently held to the principles first announced in Evangeli-
cal. As will be discussed in the next section, this system of holding gov-
ernmental entities liable in tort to the same extent as if they were private
entities has tremendous value and should be exalted.
V. THE VALUE OF GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TORTIOUS CONDUCT
Because Tardif and McKenna tend to focus on the immediate costs
of imposing tort liability on governmental entities, 43 their analysis
downplays the value of tort liability. However, the social benefits of im-
posing tort liability must be appreciated. As Justice Utter observed in
King v. Seattle, "[t]he most promising way to correct the abuses, if the
community has the political will to correct them, is to provide incentives
to the highest officials by imposing liability on the governmental unit.'
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Osborn and aligned amicus curiae, Washington State Trial Lawyers Association Founda-
tion, requested that the Osborn court abrogate the public duty doctrine because it was redundant with
traditional duty analysis, but the court refused to do so. 157 Wash. 2d at 27, 134 P.3d at 202. While
this result likely would have gone farther in eliminating skirmishes as to the impact of the doctrine,
Osborn is sufficiently clear in identifying its limited purpose as a focusing tool, so as to avoid further
misunderstanding of the doctrine. See id at 32, 134 P.3d at 205.
143. Tardif& McKenna, supra note 5, at 13-14, 31-32, 41-42, 44-45.
144. 84 Wash. 2d 239, 244, 525 P.2d 228, 232 (1974)
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The immediate costs of imposing tort liability on governmental entities
include direct litigation expenses and the payment of damages. However,
just as in the private sector, the immediate costs are outweighed by the
societal value of encouraging responsible conduct in two ways: through
holding governmental entities accountable for tortious acts and through
providing compensation to injured citizens.1 45
It has long been recognized that tort liability is a powerful tool for
encouraging responsible conduct. 146 Indeed, a primary purpose of tort
law is to provide for civil enforcement of social norms. 14 7 Private law-
suits often accomplish results that government action cannot achieve
through criminal sanctions, regulatory enforcement, or other means. 148
Both public and private actors alter their behavior in response to tort li-
ability, and any suggestion that tort liability is not an impetus for change
in the context of governmental conduct rests on the doubtful premise that
the government is uniquely unable to reform. 149
Tardif and McKenna argue that governmental entities are unlike
private entities because government is a sole-source provider of services
that affect large numbers of people, and its resources are fixed by limited
budgets, staff, and statutory mandates. 50 Governmental entities have re-
peatedly raised this type of argument, but the Washington Supreme
Court has repeatedly rejected it, instead recognizing not only that gov-
ernments are fully capable of conforming to standards of reasonable con-
duct, but also that the waiver of sovereign immunity does not equate to
145. Tardif and McKenna also note the general expansion of tort law since 1961, arguing it has
had an adverse impact on government tort liability. See Tardif & McKenna, supra note 5, at 6-7,
33-35, 52. They suggest the legislature could not have contemplated this development at the time it
waived sovereign immunity. Id. at 7. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine and defend
either the advances in tort law that have occurred over the past forty-odd years or the impact of such
advances on government liability. It is enough to note that Washington's legislature is deemed to be
familiar with Washington case law, including developments in tort law, and the legislature has not
sounded a retreat from its broad waiver of sovereign immunity. Moreover, in making governmental
entities liable in tort "as if... a private person or corporation," the legislature clearly stated its pur-
pose to eliminate the distinction between governmental and private defendants, not to establish the
substance of tort law as applied to the state and local governments. See WASH. REV. CODE §§
4.92.090, 4.96.010 (2004).
146. KEETON ET AL., supra note 90, § 4 at 25-26.
147. Id.
148. For example, it was a California jury verdict against Ford Motor Company that ultimately
resulted in Ford's issuing a voluntary recall of its Pinto automobile, a step that Ford had not taken in
the face of earlier regulatory action by the National Highway Transportation Safety Agency. See
Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the FordPinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1018-19 (1991).
149. Tardif& McKenna, supra note 5, at 46-47.
150. Id. at 47.
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absolute liability on the government.15' On the contrary, plaintiffs seek-
ing imposition of liability against a governmental defendant must still
establish duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages, just as if they
were suing a private defendant. 52 Further, a governmental entity may
defend itself against claims of liability by showing that it acted reasona-
bly according to common notions of feasibility and practicality.1 53
Moreover, circumstances involving sole-source providers, fixed re-
sources, or statutory mandates are not unique to governmental entities;
many private entities may also be sole providers of services that affect
millions of citizens, operating with fixed budgets and subject to federal
and state statutes and regulations. Even so, Washington has long under-
stood the value of holding such entities accountable for their negligence
despite their claims that exercising reasonable care would be too expen-
sive or bad for business. 154
Additionally, the value of tort liability does not lie solely in encour-
aging responsible conduct; tort liability also provides necessary compen-
sation to injured victims. This compensatory function is arguably the
greatest value that tort law provides. Indeed, the civil justice system is
uniquely suited to address the individual needs of those injured by acts of
negligence.' 55 But Tardif and McKenna appear to discount the civil jus-
tice system's ability to accomplish this goal. They unduly criticize this
most-revered institution for the redress of wrongs-including its central
feature, the jury system-when they suggest that verdicts against gov-
ernmental defendants are "excessive,"' 56 "punitive," 157 and "inflated by
151. See Taggart v. State, 118 Wash. 2d 195, 216, 822 P.2d 243, 253 (1992); Hertog v. City of
Seattle, 138 Wash. 2d 265, 279-80 n.4, 979 P.2d 400, 408-09 n.4 (1999); Tyner v. Dep't Soc. &
Health Servs., 141 Wash. 2d 68, 87-88 n.8, I P.3d 1148, 1158-59 n.8 (2000).
152. See, e.g., Taggart, 118 Wash. 2d at 218-19, 822 P.2d at 254-55 (recognizing government
liability based on traditional tort analysis, involving foreseeability of harm and pertinent policy
considerations).
153. See, e.g., Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 260-61, 407
P.2d 440, 447-48 (1965); Tyner, 141 Wash. 2d at 87-88, 1 P.3d at 1158-59; see also McCluskey v.
Handorff-Shernan, 125 Wash. 2d 1, 19-23, 882 P.2d 157, 166-68 (1994) (Brachtenbach, J., concur-
ring) (noting that cost evidence may be admissible to defend based on the feasibility or practicality
of corrective measures); Bodin v. City of Stanwood, 130 Wash. 2d 726, 745-46, 927 P.2d 240, 250-
51 (1996) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (noting that the cases that have allowed cost evidence have been
concerned with practicalities, not financial strategy).
154. See Bodin, 130 Wash. 2d at 744-45, 927 P.2d at 250 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (noting
judicial rejection of poverty defense whether raised by government or private person or corporation).
155. KEETON ET AL., supra note 90 § 4, at 20; see also Hunter v. North Mason High Sch., 85
Wash. 2d 810, 814, 539 P.2d 845, 848 (1975) (noting "the right to be indemnified for personal inju-
ries is a substantial property right, not only of monetary value but in many cases fundamental to the
injured person's physical well-being and ability to continue to have a decent life").
156. Tardif& McKenna, supra note 5, at 52.
157. Id. at 49.
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emotion and outrage."' 158 A jury of citizens, no less than a legislature of
citizens, acts as the social conscience of the community and is well
suited to weigh the value of imposing tort liability, both in terms of com-
pensation and deterrence. In any event, procedural safeguards in court
rules and statutes-including post-verdict motions for remittitur or new
trial as well as the right of appeal-alleviate the risk that excessive or
improper jury verdicts will stand.159 These institutional checks protect the
integrity of the jury system.
Finally, there is some irony in Tardif and McKenna's suggestion
that the perceived problems with government tort liability should be
solved by legislative action that "replac[es] Washington's waiver with
statutes that precisely define the extent of liability for state and local
government functions."' 60 Having criticized the judiciary's efforts at dis-
tinguishing between truly "discretionary" acts and tortious conduct, Tar-
dif and McKenna conclude that the legislature will have no difficulty
with this same task: "The history of the waiver in Washington and in
other states provides the legislature with ample information to determine'where in the area of governmental processes, orthodox tort liability
stops and the act of governing begins.' 161 However, Tardif and
McKenna rely too much on the legislature's ability to precisely define
the boundaries of tort liability without further judicial refinement-it is a
rare statute that does not encounter some legitimate dispute over its
proper scope and interpretation.
More importantly, there is no reason for the legislature to retrace its
steps. The legislature fashioned a broad waiver of sovereign immunity
that subjects governmental entities to tort liability as if they were private
sector defendants. The Washington Supreme Court has properly recog-
nized and effectuated this intent, and the legislature has not sought to
retreat from its commitment to the broad waiver. In this matter, the law-
making and interpretive functions of these two branches of government
have worked as they should. All that remains is for the executive branch
of the state to fully accept this framework of government tort liability
and focus on implementing the legislature's risk management and loss
prevention programs.
At this juncture, there is no need to ask the legislature to retrace its
steps; patience should be the order of the day. While centuries of deci-
158. Id. at 5 1; see also id. at 31-32.
159. See generally WASH. R. Civ. P. 59 (new trial or amendment ofjudgment); WASH. R. Civ.
P. 60 (relief from judgment); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.76.030 (2004) (remittitur or additur); WASH. R.
APP. P. Title 2 (designating trial court decisions subject to appeal or other appellate review).
160. Tardif& McKenna, supra note 5, at 50.
161. Id. (quoting Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 253, 407 P.2d
440, 444 (1965)).
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sion-making continue to give substance to the institution of tort law,
Washington has only a few decades' experience with extending tort prin-
ciples to governmental entities. This experience demonstrates that the
broad waiver of sovereign immunity has served a valuable function in
encouraging responsible government through greater accountability and
in providing justice for injured citizens.
VI. CONCLUSION
The waiver of sovereign immunity in Washington has marked a
tremendous step forward in social policy; it has enhanced both responsi-
ble government and individualized justice. As the law evolves, the value
of recognizing government tort liability should continue to outweigh its
costs.
The Washington legislature should not retreat from the broad
waiver of sovereign immunity for state and local governmental entities.
The broad waiver furthers respect for this state's system of government
by imposing accountability for tortious conduct of government agents
and employees. It also provides individualized justice through recovery
of compensatory damages for Washington citizens who have been vic-
timized by wrongful conduct of their state or local government. The con-
tinued viability of the broad wavier has been enhanced by appropriate
funding and staffing measures, advances in risk management strategies,
and, when justified by particular circumstances, selective restoration of
immunity.
As the waiver of sovereign immunity has been put into effect, tort
liability has been imposed on governmental entities. This process has
been aided by the thoughtful and painstaking application of the common
law by the Washington courts. The courts have extended traditional tort
analysis into the governmental context and have recognized common law
legislative, judicial, and discretionary (executive) immunities as limita-
tions on government liability. In so doing, the courts have ensured that
the specter of tort liability does not interfere with true acts of governance
by state and local entities.
The over forty years of evolution and refinement of the law regard-
ing government tort liability should not be abandoned at the very point in
time when it seems that the controlling principles have been identified,
and the law has begun to stabilize. The time and energy that would be
involved in starting over would be better spent in further refining and
supporting the system now in place.
The current system is an enlightened one, exalting the values of
government accountability as well as individualized justice. Accomplish-
ing both of these goals is understandably a difficult task--one that must
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be achieved over time. In the last forty-odd years, the legislature and the
courts have made necessary adjustments and calibrations. While this
process is by nature ongoing, a stable and largely predictable system of
government accountability has emerged. Washington citizens should be
proud of this system because it assures that Washington remains "among
the forerunners of those states abolishing the almost universally con-
demned doctrine of sovereign immunity."'1 62
162. Abbott, supra note 2, at 327.
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